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Abstract
In the context of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the debate on whether climate change should be included
and how has been ongoing since 2007. This article contributes to existing research on this problem by expounding a
three‐fold analysis. First, it assesses the conceptual approach to the climate‐security nexus from the joint statement of
10 UNSC member states in 2020. Second, it critically exposes the confusion of different climate‐security conceptions and
uncovers shared assumptions of the UNSC‐member states in 2020 by comparing their different positions, which makes a
soon‐to‐come agreement likely. Third, it critically evaluates whether the proposal to include climate change into the UNSC
will lead to a transformative change of the institution, of the meaning of security, and on how this would correspond to
the existential threats outlined in the Anthropocene context. The theoretical framework of analysis draws on critical secu‐
rity studies. It takes as its empirical basis the primary sources of the UNSC debate of 2020 and is also informed by the
secondary literature on climate and security and the Earth System Sciences descriptions of the state of the planet.
Keywords
Anthropocene; climate change; climate‐security nexus; existential threat; United Nations Security Council
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Climate Change and Security” edited by Yasuko Kameyama (National Institute for
Environmental Studies, Japan) and Yukari Takamura (University of Tokyo, Japan).
© 2021 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu‐
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
As exemplified by this thematic issue, the links between
climate change and security are controversially debated,
being clearly defined neither in theory nor in practice.
One of the reasons for this is that many existing inter‐
pretations of the climate‐security nexus confuse differ‐
ent aspects and provide at most a non‐transparent cock‐
tail that can appear at times as a magic potion and
at others as a poison with malign effects. In theory
and practice, the climate‐security nexus covers a broad
range of interdependent issues, such as the question
of how climate change is linked to or even produces
phenomena ranging from vulnerability, instability, and
poverty, to loss of statehood and national territory, vio‐
lent conflict, global health effects, forced displacements,
and the increased intensity and frequency of weather
extremes, as well as to threats to the future of humanity
itself (e.g., Security Council Report, 2021; United Nations
General Assembly, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; United Nations
Security Council [UNSC], 2011). Several academic propo‐
sitions exist that aim to re‐define the traditional secu‐
rity concept of the nation‐state (Mearsheimer, 2001)
in order to address and deal with the new quality of
threat posed by climate change, and to provide guid‐
ance for global governance actors. Examples include
the strengthening of the environmental dimension of
human security focusing on basic human needs (Barnett
& Adger, 2007), the ecological security concept that
focuses on earth system processes (McDonald, 2018),
and cosmopolitan security that focuses on ethics (Burke
et al., 2014).Most of this critical peace, conflict, and secu‐
rity research draws on Earth System Sciences descrip‐
tions, which locate the planet on a trajectory towards
a “Hothouse Earth” climate (see Steffen et al., 2018).
Moreover, those approaches frequently claim to offer a
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paradigm shift, which is then also applied to the neces‐
sity of redefining the very meaning and politics of secu‐
rity (Dalby, 2020; Hardt, 2021; Harrington & Shearing,
2017; Lövbrand et al., 2021).
This article does not present a blueprint for
how to re‐define security in the new context of the
Anthropocene. Instead of projecting future ideals, it
takes stock of how security is understood in relation
to climate change already today. For this, it takes the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a case study.
The UNSC provides the perfect analytical object for the
following reasons. First, the UNSC is the only organ with
a mandate to maintain international peace and security
and as such seems ideally positioned to address the enor‐
mous, multiple, and entangled threats that manifest in
the climate‐security nexus and the broader descriptions
of “existential threat” (Lenton et al., 2019, p. 595) in the
Anthropocene. Second, the fierce debate on whether
and how the UNSC should or could conceive, prepare
for, and handle the dramatic and varied implications of
climate change has occupied the 15 UNSC (10 elected
and five permanent) member states since 2007. An offi‐
cial recognition of the multiple connections between
climate change and other larger socio‐ecological phe‐
nomena, such as their links to security, is still lacking.
This article contributes to research on the UNSC
case study within the climate and security literature.
For this body of work, we can observe a change of
tenor over the last years. In earlier research, a cautious
approach to climate‐security in the UNSC was called for
(see e.g., Cousins, 2013; Scott, 2015) due to the possi‐
ble negative consequences of militarization of environ‐
mental or climate politics and of a misuse of any envi‐
ronmental agenda for geopolitical interests (see e.g.,
Trombetta, 2008). More recently, literature has been
underpinned by a growing claim that international gov‐
ernance actors and also the UNSC cannot continue to
ignore climate change and its multiple effects and inter‐
connections with security. Accordingly, a number of pro‐
posals for how to transform the UNSC have been put for‐
ward (Conca, 2019; Hardt & Viehoff, 2020; Scott & Ku,
2018). Another research focus explores ways in which
climate change has already come to be included in the
UNSC. Securitization (Scott & Ku, 2018) and climatiza‐
tion (Maertens, 2021; Maertens & Hardt, 2021) have
served as important analytical tools that critically engage
with the various UNSC debates, the informal and expert‐
focused Arria‐Formula Meetings and the recognition of
the adverse impacts of climate change on stability in
several UNSC resolutions (see Security Council Report,
2021). In this development, 2020 marked an important
moment in attempts to include climate change in the
UNSC agenda.
This article focuses on the 2020 joint statement
led by Germany, which brought together for the first
time 10 UNSC member states in a Joint Initiative
to Address Climate‐Related Security Risks (Ten UNSC
Member States, 2020). The short statement is impor‐
tant not only because it represents a peak in the secu‐
ritization process but also because, according to several
informal sources and media coverage (Dziadosz, 2020;
Fillion, 2021), the German Permanent Mission (PM) had
already been preparing a UNSC resolution before, but
refrained from presenting it due to the announcement
from the US under President Donald Trump to veto it.
The 10 UNSC member states coalition statement there‐
fore is likely to include the key points of this not publicly
available draft resolution (see Security Council Report,
2021). In addition, this joint statement provides the
opportunity, on the one hand, to assess how the propo‐
nents understand security in relation to climate change
and, on the other, to display the effects of disentangling
the climate‐security cocktail. This article focuses less on
process (as climatization and securitization analyses do)
than on critically analyzing the conceptual approach of
climate‐security, which is the original and central contri‐
bution of this research because it enables a more dif‐
ferentiated criticism and analysis for policy makers and
for scientists. The article furthermore investigates the
questions of whether the UNSC stands at the forefront
of including climate change and whether this would sup‐
pose a transformative change of the/for the UNSC and
for security conceptions.
The analysis is based on the theoretical framework
developed by critical security studies (see Bigo, 2010;
Booth, 2005; Buzan et al., 1998), which share the
assumption that security is a constructed concept inex‐
tricably linked to the actor itself, as well as to its his‐
torical and sociopolitical contexts, culture, and world‐
views (Peoples & Vaughan‐Williams, 2010). Therefore,
security is not understood as a fixed but as an evolv‐
ing and context‐dependent concept. Accordingly, it is
used as a research tool that explores the understandings
and assumptions that underpin specific threat construc‐
tions and responses as a kind of “security prism” (see
Hardt, 2018). On the basis of a qualitative analysis of
the primary sources, I analyze and present the climate‐
security concept by assembling the explicitly used ref‐
erences into referent object (security for what/whom?),
threat (security fromwhat threats?), and response (secu‐
rity by what means?).
The research is furthermore informed by the dis‐
persed literature on climate and security, which focuses
on different issues, such as the interrelations between
climate change and violent conflict, peace (see for an
overview Swain & Öjendal, 2018) and security (see
Trombetta, in press), and existential security threats
(Sears, 2020). It also includes the Earth System Sciences
literature and the emerging literature on international
relations and security in the Anthropocene, which dis‐
tinguishes between Holocene and Anthropocene think‐
ing (Cudworth & Hobden, 2011). While Holocene think‐
ing presupposes a clear distinction between humans and
nature, Anthropocene thinking challenges the human‐
nature dualism and eventually implies a re‐definition of
themeaning of security in such away as to overcome the
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focus on conflict in favor of a re‐assessment of the cen‐
tral values that need to be secured in new situations of
survival and ethics (see Hardt, 2018, 2021; Harrington &
Shearing, 2017).
The analysis unfolds in four sections. In the next sec‐
tion I assess the climate‐security concept by the propo‐
nents to include climate change in the UNSC (10 UNSC
member states coalition). In Section 3, this approach is
juxtaposed to the descriptions of the matter submitted
by the five remaining UNSC member states. I investigate
whether adopting this proposal would result in a trans‐
formative change of the UNSC. The concluding section
indicates some recommendations for future research,
defends the assessment that a fundamental change is
not in sight, and that, as a result, the security threats
associated with the Anthropocene are ignored.
2. The 10 UNSC Members States’ Climate‐Security
Concept
As described above, the climate‐security nexus is inter‐
preted in several differentways. Hardt andViehoff (2020)
showed that the foci and interpretations of the climate‐
security nexus varies enormously among UNSC member
states and observed an important divergence between
domestic and foreign politics in theUNSC context. Amiss‐
ing research focus so far consists in dissecting the unify‐
ing meaning/understanding of climate‐security that the
10 UNSC member states coalition has in common.
In what follows, I assess this 10 UNSC member
states coalition’s underlying climate‐security concept on
the basis of two primary sources. The first is the Joint
Declaration by Belgium, France, the Dominican Republic
(hereafter DomRep), Estonia, Germany, Niger, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines (hereafter SVG), Tunisia,
the United Kingdom (UK), and Vietnam (Ten UNSC
Member States, 2020). The second is the 2020 UNSC
debate “Maintenance of international peace and secu‐
rity: Climate and security” (UNSC, 2020). As the state‐
ments from Niger and Tunisia are missing in the official
document, the Niger position is substituted by the pre‐
sented brief from Niger, while the Tunisian statement is
subsumed to the position of the Declaration (Ten UNSC
Member States, 2020). The security prism research tool
applied here enables a cross‐cutting analysis of the differ‐
ent statements on the basis of literal quotes presented in
Table 1. Though there aremany differences, the aim here
is to identify the, as it were, combined underlying con‐
cept that does not focus on contradictions but on group‐
ing and making collective sense of the commonly shared
descriptions. Important for this is, of course, the qualita‐
tive analysis of the empirical data and the classification
into corresponding categories.
A further limitation is that this methodology nei‐
ther captures the process nor future approaches but
instead takes stock of how the existing underlying con‐
cept of security is influenced by and/or related to cli‐
mate change. This is how I seek to analyze the cosmol‐
ogy/grammar that provides the background of the pro‐
ponents’ understanding of the climate‐security concept.
I also do not question whether the links between cli‐
mate change and e.g., conflict exist or not, even though
the academic discussion on the matter continues (see
Dalby, 2020; Mach & Kraan, 2021). Instead, I intend
to capture the logics of these links that are taken for
granted and described by the UNSC member states
as embodied/existent. This research is limited to dis‐
course analysis, and as such is unable to distinguish this
neatly from power politics, underlying interests, or other
key phenomena—indispensable notions which require
future research.
In what follows, I will present the research results
for the categories of security objects and goals, threats,
and responses as described in Table 1. I critically ana‐
lyze how the climate‐security concept that is operative
in these data implies an understanding of security at vari‐
ance with traditional notions. I also investigate the way
in which human‐nature relations are conceptualized so
as to assess whether Anthropocene thinking is included
in this renewed concept.
2.1. Security Objects
Applying the security prism as an analytical lens to
these data, the detected security objects are inter‐
national peace, security, and stability (Ten UNSC
Member States, 2020) and “prosperity for our peo‐
ple and our planet” (UNSC, 2020, pp. 12 [Vietnam],
15 [UK]). Furthermore, the stability of states and
societies (UNSC, 2020, pp. 5 [Niger], 14 [Estonia]) is
at the center of attention. Confronting these secu‐
rity objects with the Anthropocene context and with
the scientific descriptions of the current state of the
world (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
[IPCC], 2021), it becomes clear that neither Life, the
Earth System Boundaries, the “safe operating space”
(Rockström et al., 2009), humans, children, nor future
generations are included in this security understand‐
ing. Therefore, it should be emphasized that while the
articulated statements on including climate change in
the UNSC might at times appear to be informed by the
findings of the latest climate sciences (see also other
descriptions below) the referent objects of climate secu‐
rity remain limited to anthropocentric notions of states
and societies with only the faintest emphasis on “planet”
as a source of prosperity for “people.”
2.2. Security Threats
According to traditional conceptions of security as
expressed in the original UNSC mandate, the central
threat to security is violent conflict. Climate change
comes into the picture primarily because of its multiple
adverse posited effects on conflict. In the documents,
two different kinds of links between climate change
and conflict appear, one indirect and one direct. Within
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Table 1. Climate‐security concept of the 10 UNSC member states coalition.
Security prism Climate‐Security Concept
Security objects and goals • Global and international peace, security and stability of states and societies
• Sustainable peace and prosperity
Security threats • Climate change as a threat multiplier
• Climate change intensifies drivers of conflict and fragility
• Climate change as an existential threat
Security responses UNSC
1. Multilateral, preventive, and responsible state action
2. Improved assessments and conflict analysis
• Information on climate change impacts on security
• Local and context focused analysis of threats and responses, respecting sovereignty
issues and mandates
• Climate‐related security risks inclusion into UNSC assessment and decision‐making
• Systematic reporting on climate‐related security risks by the Secretary‐General
• Climate proofing of resolutions
• Climate‐security approach must be sensitive to inequalities and gender
3. Institutional support for the UNSC on climate‐security
• Special Envoy and/or Special Representative
• Expert group
Other
• Climate Security Mechanism
• Mainstreaming climate politics/proofing of the UN
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Sources: Ten UNSC Member States (2020); UNSC (2020).
the indirect and potential relations, climate change is
described as affecting certain processes, such as water
and food security, displacements and social tensions
(Ten UNSC Member States, 2020), sea‐level rise, eco‐
nomic shocks, scarce resources (UNSC, 2020, p. 15 [UK]),
and competition over scarce resources (UNSC, 2020,
p. 12 [Vietnam]). This then leads to “potentially exac‐
erbate, prolong or contribute to the risk of future con‐
flicts and instability” (Ten UNSC Member States, 2020).
Similarly, climate change is seen as a threat multiplier,
through which, in combination with e.g., poverty and
low state capacity, climate changemight potentially insti‐
gate, exacerbate, prolong, anddrive conflict (UNSC, 2020,
p. 12 [Vietnam]).
The direct relationship between climate and con‐
flict is expressed in the statement that climate change
“intensifies important drivers of conflict and fragility”
(UNSC, 2020, p. 14 [Estonia]) and aggravates existing
threats (Ten UNSCMember States, 2020), in the sense of
already existing conflicts, such as the case of the farmers–
herders conflict (UNSC, 2020, p. 6 [Niger]): “Climate
change reinforces existing social, political, economic and
environmental drivers of conflict” and the complexity of
the effects of climate change is highlighted (UNSC, 2020,
p. 10 [Belgium]). In addition, a vicious cycle between con‐
flict and climate change is noted, given that the local and
contextual situation inhibits adaptation measures to cli‐
mate change and is therefore in turn more prone again
to conflict (UNSC, 2020, pp. 5–6 [Niger]).
The impact of climate change is understood to affect
all the populations across the globe (Ten UNSC Member
States, 2020), but the areas of primary concern are vul‐
nerable regions and existing situations of conflict, such
as Haiti, Afghanistan, and the Sahel (UNSC, 2020, p. 25
[SVG]). In some cases, the UNSCmember states highlight
their own vulnerabilities to climate change, as e.g., Niger
(the Sahel), Vietnam (the Mekong), and the island states
(their territorial integrity in general). The DomRep and
SVG refer to their territorial vulnerability resulting from
natural catastrophes and the permanent loss of land as
an “existential threat” (UNSC, 2020, pp. 19 [DomRep],
25 [SVG]). This is clearly linked to the traditional and ter‐
ritorial understanding of security but adds new dimen‐
sions. Aside from the Small Islands Developing States and
conflict‐prone regions, women and girls are described as
being particularly vulnerable and exposed to threats.
Other references to climate change as “ourmost exis‐
tential challenge” (UNSC, 2020, p. 10 [Belgium]) seem
to transport an additional qualitative threat dimension
with respect to future generations. A more specific inves‐
tigation into the ways in which this challenge is explic‐
itly described shows, however, that the notion of future
generations is absent from the climate‐security concept,
although young people are (partly) given a voice in the
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 5–15 8
Belgian delegation—which aims to “not fail” their expec‐
tations (UNSC, 2020, pp. 10 [Belgium], 13 [Germany])—
and the Nigerien statement expresses the aim to protect
young people from the impact of future conflict (UNSC,
2020, p. 6 [Niger]). This remains ignorant of the scientific
descriptions of the implications of climate change (IPCC,
2021; Lenton et al., 2019) and the overall analysis shows
that an existential threat for humanity and for future gen‐
erations is not spelled out and therefore not of funda‐
mental concern.
Some statements might be interpreted as alluding
to a certain recognition of nature and the Earth System,
but they remain the exception. Thus, the SVG statement
describes the need to “drastically change our planet’s tra‐
jectory” (UNSC, 2020, p. 25 [SVG]), which can be inter‐
preted as an allusion to research on the Hothouse Earth
because of the term“trajectory” (see Steffen et al., 2018).
Also, Germany describes the force of nature:
As diplomats and politicians, we tend to think that
everything is negotiable. This is also the under‐
lying idea behind the Security Council: building
international consensus. But we cannot negotiate
with nature. The physical, chemical and geographi‐
cal realities of global warming will not compromise
with us….The fight against climate change should
not divide us. We fight it to save ourselves, and
we fight it for the people around the world who
are already facing violence and displacement as a
result of climate change. They cannot afford to wait.
The time for diplomatic patience is therefore over.
The Security Council cannot negotiate with the real‐
ities of nature. Action is all that counts. (UNSC, 2020,
p. 13 [Germany])
As these quotations show, the broader context of natu‐
ral forces is acknowledged to a certain degree as creating
a need to act but the very notion of threat itself focuses
on conflict and the stability of the state system. It is also
noteworthy that the human–nature relation is perceived
as separated and nature as a hostile enemy.
2.3. Security Responses
Looking at the category of security responses, key terms
are the common responsibility (UNSC, 2020, pp. 6
[Niger], 14 [Estonia]) and multilateral action (UNSC,
2020, p. 12 [Vietnam]). Aside from these general princi‐
ples, the concrete responses and activities deemed nec‐
essary are to be split up among different organizations,
both within the UNSC and in other institutions outside
of the UNSC. A central response within the UNSC con‐
sists in improving the conflict analysis with respect to the
multifaceted impacts of the climate‐security nexus (Ten
UNSC Member States, 2020) and in strengthening “the
capacities of the Secretariat in terms of climate expertise
and coordination” (UNSC, 2020, p. 20 [France]). In order
to adequately consider the perceived local and context‐
specific characteristic of the climate‐security nexus, cli‐
mate change should be included in the analysis at a local
level and thereby enable to establish an “evidence‐based
approach to climate‐security threats” and build spe‐
cific “solutions to the fragile and conflict‐affected States”
(UNSC, 2020, p. 16 [UK]). The mainstreaming and “inclu‐
sion of climate‐related security risks into the Security
Council’s overall assessment and decision‐making” (Ten
UNSC Member States, 2020), as well as the systematic
reporting from the Secretary‐General to the Security
Council on climate‐related security risks (UNSC, 2020,
pp. 14 [Estonia], 16 [UK], 20 [DomRep]), are impor‐
tant additional responses. Furthermore, the UNSC reso‐
lutions require a general climate proofing for an effec‐
tive implementation (UNSC, 2020, pp. 11 [Belgium],
16 [UK]). Meanwhile, it is emphasized that the “Council
should continue with an integrated and comprehensive
approach in addressing root causes of conflicts, such as
poverty, injustice, militarism and disregard for interna‐
tional law,” but adapt this list so as to also include climate
change in relation to crisis and conflict (UNSC, 2020, p. 12
[Vietnam]). While a sensitive approach to inequalities
and gender is claimed to be required (UNSC, 2020, pp. 5
[Niger], 15 [UK], 25 [SVG]), neither children nor future
generations are explicitly mentioned, nor larger future‐
oriented conceptions of security or drivers of inequal‐
ity. Instead, the focus lies on the local level and on
the importance of respecting state sovereignty, national
ownership, and mandates (UNSC, 2020, pp. 5 [Niger],
12 [Vietnam]) once decisions need to be taken on “how
to build resilience” (UNSC, 2020, p. 15 [UK]). Additional
measures within the UNSC consist in strengthening the
institutional support for theUNSC in the formof a Special
Envoy and/or Special Representative for climate‐security
(UNSC, 2020, pp. 13 [Germany], 14 [Estonia], 22 [France],
25 [SVG]), and in establishing an informal expert group
(UNSC, 2020, pp. 10 [Belgium], 13 [Germany]).
Beyond the UNSC, a shared view of the coalition
is that the UN Climate Security Mechanism (UNSC,
2020, p. 20 [France]) needs to be bolstered further.
This entity was established by a joint initiative of
the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, the
UnitedNations Environment Programme, and theUnited
Nations Development Programme to further dialogue
and exchange on the linkage between climate change
and security among UN institutions, situated at the UN
headquarters in New York. The UN Climate Security
Mechanism also works closely with the UN Group of
Friends on Climate and Security, established in 2018 by
Germany and Nauru and which today counts more than
50 members (UNSC, 2020, p. 43).
Additional responses are the mainstreaming of cli‐
mate policies throughout the UN and the coopera‐
tion on the issue throughout all mandates and lev‐
els of the UN (UNSC, 2020, pp. 5 [Niger], 25 [SVG]).
An important disclosure is that the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
remains the “primary body for addressing climate
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change” (UNSC, 2020, p. 25 [SVG]), guiding “national
and global responses based on mitigation, adaptation
and resilience” and “contribut[ing] to the prevention
of climate‐induced conflicts and crises” (UNSC, 2020,
p. 12 [Vietnam]).
2.4. Cross‐Cutting Critical Observations of the Security
Concept
Overall, the research results presented here correspond
in several aspects to the well‐known sets of traditional
security, and also partly to human security, adding cli‐
mate change as one of several causes of insecurity into
locally specific accounts (see UNSC, 2020, p. 14 [Estonia])
and to a certain extent includes also the broader dimen‐
sions such as e.g., migration, etc. It is worth noting that
the referent object and the threat description show that
the major concern is conflict, while the response sec‐
tion shows a considerable change of position when it
comes to the meaning and also the politics of secu‐
rity. Compared to the traditional security concept, the
security responses are relatively surprising in that they
do not match the above‐described security object and
threats. The non‐militarized responses are furthermore
non‐extraordinary, permanent, and, as it were, preven‐
tive actions of e.g., including scientific expertise that
could be interpreted as responding to the concern, fre‐
quently articulated, of a possible militarization of the
issue and/or as a result of the trend of climate change
riskification (see Corry, 2012; Estève, 2021). On these
additional dimensions of incoherence, confusion, and
the resulting tensions,more research is required. Overall,
this shows that this climate security concept merges dif‐
ferent and at times conflicting conceptual approaches
and is not exhausted by existing literature.
3. Climate Change at the UNSC: At the Forefront of
Confusion, Transformation, and Ignorance
This section extends the investigation to the remaining
UNSC member states, and projects likely future develop‐
ments of the UNSC with specific focus on the transfor‐
mative potential resulting from a possible inclusion of cli‐
mate change in the UNSC.
3.1. At the Edge of UNSC Confusion and Consensus
In what follows, I compare the 10 UNSC member states
coalition’s climate‐security concept to the positions of
the UNSCmember states that did not sign the statement
and that are portrayed as opponents/sceptics when it
comes to attempts to include climate change into the
UNSC, namely Russia, China, Indonesia, South Africa
(hereafter S‐Africa), and the US. The US is treated sep‐
arately because of the special role that accrues to it due
to its announcement to block the resolution and because
of the relatively non‐descript and non‐transparent state‐
ment on the matter in the 2020 UNSC debate. The ana‐
lysis assembles the statements of the actors from the
UNSC debate document (2020) in addition to the Russian
and the US statements gathered from their webpages, as
these are excluded from the official document. On this
basis, I categorize the concerns against including climate
change within the UNSC into three main clusters and
I then compare the general descriptions of the climate‐
security nexus climate‐security concept of Table 1.
The assessment shows that, similar to the above‐
outlined climate‐security concept, most of the remain‐
ing four states note that it is the UNFCCC that holds
“the primary mandate and capabilities to galvanize that
type of action by the international community” (UNSC,
2020, pp. 24 [Indonesia], 27 [S‐Africa]). They argue that
the different mandates, available resources, and exper‐
tise of the UNFCCC and the UNSC should not over‐
lap (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to
the UN [PM Russia], 2020; UNSC, 2020, pp. 17 [China],
27 [S‐Africa]). Russia (PM Russia, 2020) also highlights
that the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are the bodies
in charge of climate change and that the main concern
is that diverting the focus to the UNSC and pulling the
“security card” will not lead to adequate responses but
rather “be detrimental to those most vulnerable, in par‐
ticular the least developed countries, landlocked devel‐
oping countries and small island developing states.” Also,
Indonesia (2020, p. 24) states that “discussion and con‐
sideration regarding climate‐related security risks can be
beneficial only if they lead to eventual action in address‐
ing climate change appropriately through robust mitiga‐
tion and adaptation action” and thereby indirectly sug‐
gests the significance of climate policies of the UNFCCC
for security. Multilateral responsible action of states
is also highlighted. These descriptions are consonant
with the above‐described climate‐security conception of
the proponents.
Another shared concern, similar to the above‐
described climate‐security conception, is the missing
scientific evidence on the generalized links between cli‐
mate change and conflict, given that “there is no con‐
clusive, universally recognized and scientifically substan‐
tiated evidence that climate change has an impact on
armed conflicts” (PMRussia, 2020). According to S‐Africa
(UNSC, 2020, p. 27):
There is currently little scientific evidence to support
the more generalized conclusions of a direct causal‐
ity between climate change and threats to interna‐
tional peace and security. S‐Africa therefore remains
wary of introducing climate change into the Security
Council as a thematic issue, or adopting generic deci‐
sions in this forum.
At the same time, S‐Africa (UNSC, 2020, p. 27) states that:
Instead,where climate change is thought to be a clear
contributing factor to a threat to international peace
and security, it is appropriate for the Security Council
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to comment on this issue, within the specific context
of the countries that may be affected.
A third unifying concern shared by all four states is
that “the linkage between climate change and secu‐
rity risks is highly context‐specific” (UNSC, 2020, p. 23
[Indonesia]) and “country‐specific,” and therefore needs
to be addressed “in line with the mandates of the rele‐
vant resolutions” (UNSC, 2020, p. 17 [China]). Indonesia
(UNSC, 2020, p. 23) states that a UNSC‐climate‐security
approach would obscure other political factors and
causes of conflict. Russia (PM Russia, 2020) outlines the
complexity of the issue and of harmful effects of such a
depoliticized focus on root causes of conflict as follows:
Weagree that security and stability in individual coun‐
tries and regions may be affected by adverse impacts
of climate change as one of the multiple factors. But
the root causes of conflicts are much more complex
where climate change may be one of the factors,
country or region specific. We strongly disagree that
climate is a generic security issue. (PM Russia, 2020)
Another main concern regarding the inclusion of climate
change into the UNSC is that it would “result in divert‐
ing time and resources from addressing the root causes
of conflicts” and would put into doubt the different man‐
dates of the institutions, and “dubious and vague inter‐
pretation of risk factors could only lead to false conclu‐
sions and, as a result, failure to provide effective solu‐
tions” (PM Russia, 2020). Put differently, the context‐
specificity and the effects of climate change on conflict
are recognized in some cases but their concept of secu‐
rity excludes climate other than as a contingent and
local factor.
The US position requires a special assessment. The
US (Permanent Mission of the US to the UN [PM US],
2020) statement does not clearly oppose including cli‐
mate change into the UNSC, even though it blocked
the resolution on climate change by threatening to
veto it (Dziadosz, 2020; Security Council Report, 2021).
Furthermore, it should be noted that during the previ‐
ous Arria‐Formula Meeting in April 2020, the US state‐
ment indirectly linked climate change to security, listing
it as one among other factors and challenges that affects
security, instability and conflict (Barkin, 2020). This inco‐
herence and the lack of clear opposition in the writ‐
ten statement indicate the limitations of this assessment.
In the statement, no reference to the term “conflict” can
be found, but what is highlighted is the required context‐
specific and local focus with reference to natural disas‐
ters: “It is this focus onwork on the ground thatwill make
a difference by continuing to enhance the resilience of
our global partners to the impacts of climate change and
natural disasters” (PM US, 2020). In other words, the
statement does not deny potential links.
On the basis of this outline, I assemble the dif‐
ferent descriptions and compare them to the climate‐
security concept of the 10 UNSC member states coali‐
tion and I find three key overlaps. The opponents do,
to a certain extent, recognize several links between cli‐
mate change and security. While slight variations exist
between the positions of different states—the US being
handled apart—an agreement can be noted on the fact
that climate change in some cases is linked to conflict and
the localized and contextualized approach of vulnerable
and/or conflictive and/or instable local contexts and the
island states impacted by climate change. The four ana‐
lyzed states locate the responsibility to address the root
causes in the UNFCCC and/or on the local and nation‐
state level, as well as stress the need for more research.
The work of the UN Climate Security Mechanism is also
recognized by S‐Africa, and even highlighted as requiring
support by Indonesia (UNSC, 2020, p. 23).
Comparing these concerns to the proposed climate‐
security concept, I conclude that the seemingly divergent
and partly opposing positions of the 2020 UNSCmember
states do in fact passively share a certain climate‐security
conception. The first column of Table 2 presents the clus‐
ters of concern and in the second column shows how the
re‐formulation of these concerns intersects with the pro‐
ponents’ views on climate‐security nexus.
Thus, a certain agreement on the climate‐security
concept exists within the UNSC 2020. This analysis
showed the beneficial effects that the effort to disentan‐
gle the climate‐security cocktail into more specific argu‐
ments has in terms of opening up possibilities for dia‐
logue. These research results raise new questions con‐
cerning future developments, which I will outline in the
following section.
3.2. Projections, Evaluations, and Implications: Rising to
the Challenge of the Anthropocene?
The research findings of an existing overlap on the
climate‐security nexus concept among all 15 UNSCmem‐
ber states in 2020 suggest that (overriding possible
underlying power politics, national interests, and value
considerations), on the basis of dialogue and diplomatic
efforts, an official adoption of climate change in the
UNSC seems forthcoming. While it is important to note
that the above‐described intersections applied to the
UNSC‐member states of 2020 and that the UNSC mem‐
ber states constellation is different now, the climate‐
security nexus remains on the agenda also in 2021.
Thus, another UNSC debate on the issue was initiated
by the UK in February 2021, and the new US adminis‐
tration explicitly affirms that “the climate crisis is indis‐
putably a Security Council issue” (PMUS, 2021). Also, the
recent creation of an Informal Expert Group on Climate
and Security tolerated by Russia and China—both send
observers to the meetings (Security Council Report,
2021)—further suggests an at least passive acknowledge‐
ment of the climate‐security nexus.
The prospect of an adoption of climate change can
be evaluated as a sign that the UNSC takes this issue
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Table 2. Comparison of descriptions on climate‐security nexus at the UNSC 2020.
Clusters of concerns of sceptics of including climate Overlaps between the proponents and sceptics on
change in the UNSC climate‐security nexus
• UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are the bodies in
charge of climate change
• Different mandates, available resources and expertise
of the UNFCCC and the UNSC should not overlap
• UNFCCC is the primary mandate for handling climate
politics
• Duplications of mandates need to be avoided
• Scientific evidence on the generalized links between
climate change and conflict is missing
• Additional scientific evidence on climate‐security
nexus is required and a de‐politicized analysis to
be avoided
• Conflict constellations and causes are country‐ or
region‐specific
• Root causes of conflicts are complex, even if climate
change might be one of the factors
• Climate change in certain regions affects security, via
being linked to conflict and weather extremes and is
therefore context‐specific
Sources: PM Russia (2020); PM US (2020); UNSC (2020); and also Table 1.
seriously and as a symbolically important step that real‐
izes a long‐term goal both in practice (since the first
debate in 2007) and in theory (see e.g., Scott & Ku, 2018).
I do, however, evaluate this potential recognition as but
a minor change in relation to the UNSC itself and to the
meaning of security more generally. This is for the follow‐
ing reasons. First, the climate‐security conceptions cover
certain topics that are relatively congruent with the tra‐
ditional security concept, in the sense of being limited
to conflict, especially in specific and vulnerable regions.
The underlying understanding of the object of security
andof security (conflict and stability), aswell as theUNSC
mandate, remain untouched. Moreover, several recogni‐
tions of the climate‐security nexus that are already in
place, e.g., in theUNSCResolutions (see e.g., UNSC, 2017,
for Resolution 2349 on Niger; for various field mission
mandates, see e.g.,MINUSMA [Mali];MINUSCA [Central‐
African Republic]; UNOWAS [Sahel]; UNAMID [Darfur]),
refer to the relation between climate change and stabil‐
ity. In January 2021, two additional UNSC Resolutions
that include climate change were agreed upon, which
for the first time widen the geographical scope beyond
the African continent to include Cyprus and Iraq (Security
Council Report, 2021). It could therefore be argued that
climate change has entered the UNSC through a back
door, that it is already part of the central UNSC instru‐
ments (seeMaertens, 2021), and that, as a result, an offi‐
cial recognition would have little effect beyond an a pos‐
teriori endorsement.
If compared to the scientific descriptions of existen‐
tial threats in the Anthropocene, the effects of such a
limited inclusion of the climate‐security nexus in the
UNSCwould be relatively insignificant, in the sense that it
ignores themost crucial concerns. As shownbyMaertens
and Hardt (2021, p. 53), “the term ‘Anthropocene’
does not appear in UN Security Council documents
and debates.” The new meanings and qualitative shifts
for a security understanding of the human nature‐
entangled dynamic world of the Anthropocene is totally
eclipsed. Even though the above‐described statements
from Germany and SVG (UNSC, 2020, pp. 13, 25) allude
to broader conceptions of nature, they still rely on the
Holocene understanding of nature as a counter‐force
from which humans are detached and against which a
unified fight is necessary. Similarly, China’s (UNSC, 2020,
p. 17) statement highlights that:
Humans and nature share a community of life. What
hurts nature hurts humans. Climate change poses a
major obstacle to sustainable development. The out‐
break of the coronavirus disease (Covid‐19) reminds
us again that no country or individual is immune to
global challenges, and solidarity and cooperation are
what is most needed. Climate change endangers the
future of humankind and requires joint efforts by all
of us.
The socio‐ecological intertwinements of the Anthro‐
pocene and the scientific predictions of the Earth System
Sciences concerning trajectories towards a Hothouse
Earth (Lenton et al., 2019; Steffen et al., 2018) and
the existential threat for future generations have appar‐
ently not yet entered the understanding of the existing
climate‐security nexus at theUNSC level (Hardt&Viehoff,
2020, pp. 108–110). In general, and despite the refer‐
ence to the need to “drastically change our planet’s tra‐
jectory” (UNSC, 2020, p. 25 [SVG]), socio‐ecological inter‐
twinements are not considered, or only in the sense of a
cause‐and‐effect chain that impacts on humans, stability,
and security (conflict). Further descriptions on the mat‐
ter of ecology, such as, e.g., possible “tipping cascades,”
which cause “abrupt, nonlinear responses (conversion of
Amazon to Savanna)” (Lenton et al., 2019; Steffen et al.,
2018, p. 4) and uncontrollable change, or any other addi‐
tional temporally extensive security threat related to cli‐
mate change remain absent. At the same time, it is sig‐
nificant that this approach to include climate change into
the UNSC singles the UNFCCC out as the primary body of
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intervention with respect to addressing the root causes
of climate change. This is how one of the effects would
turn the UNFCCC into a security actor via reducing the
likelihood for conflict and at the same time put it in
charge of handling existential threats.
4. Concluding Remarks and Outlook
This article addressed the following questions: a) is an
official recognition of a link between climate change and
security in the UNSC likely in the near future?; b) what
does the proposition to include climate‐security in the
UNSC look like?; c) what would this imply for the UNSC as
an institution?; and d) how does this approach measure
up to the scientific descriptions of climate threats and
Anthropocene contexts? The analysis produced three
main insights. First, I exposed the climate‐security con‐
cept. Second, I showed that, in contrast to previous
expectations, a certain passively sharedmainstream con‐
ception of an interrelated climate‐security nexus exists.
I conclude that, as a result, a consensus on the matter
is being established, which also produces incoherences
and confusions. Third, however, a transformative change
of the UNSC and of the meaning and politics of security
is not in sight; on the contrary, the basic tenets of inter‐
national relations in force since 1945 persist despite the
new challenges and threats described by the sciences.
Comparing these research results to existing Security
Studies literature on the climate‐security nexus can help
formulate a range of future research questions. First,
Security Studies and climate change research will have
to re‐assess several key assumptions and also specifi‐
cally focus on the theory–practice analysis. Doubts on
whether the concept of security changes need to be
re‐assessed in light of analyzing the practices by several
actors (see also Berling et al., 2021). Another research
finding is that a frequentlymentioned counter‐argument
against the climate‐security nexus, namely a possible
militarization of the issue (see Trombetta, 2008), is not
mentioned by the opponents (see Section 3). In the
UNSC 2020 debate, possible militarization was only men‐
tioned once for the case of the Arctic—and not as a pos‐
sible adverse impact but as an already occurring phe‐
nomenon (UNSC, 2020, p. 10 [Belgium]), so in terms of
a pro‐argument. Future research will have to examine
more systematically the climate‐security concept ana‐
lyzed here in light of scientific research on the climate‐
security link. As I have outlined above, this concept
excludes and ignores important scientific descriptions of
climate security. Another future research inquiry could
focus on why, e.g., the Anthropocene and the scien‐
tific descriptions from the Earth System Sciences are not
taken up at the UNSC debates. The reasons for this still
need to be analyzed, and one possible research path
could follow the lines of information flow and the rel‐
atively non‐transparent science‐policy nexus. Assessing
the sources and providers of knowledge on climate‐
security links would require an analysis of the role of
think tanks—for example, the think tank Adelphi, which
is explicitly mentioned in the UNSC debate (UNSC, 2020,
pp. 5–6 [Niger])—as well as other experts who con‐
tribute to the discussion. Aside from the power poli‐
tics of knowledge, other forms of power politics within
the climate‐security nexus require more attention from
researchers. Finally, another important research ques‐
tion should more specifically concern uncovering the
institutional gap in theUN system that existswith respect
to the existential security threats in the context of the
Anthropocene and engage more specifically in how to
break this stalemate.
Overall, the analysis presented here attempted to
disentangle the climate‐security black box by investigat‐
ing the prevalent understandings of this nexus aiming
to open up opportunities for future dialogue and also
for drawing out what remains to be addressed. It aimed
to encourage additional efforts to think security in the
Anthropocene, as the existential security threats (see
Sears, 2020) and newmeanings of security as yet remain
largely ignored by the only institution that has the man‐
date to deal with security threats.
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